International Tech Cooperation in 2024: What Experts Want
What’s one thing you’d like to see happen in 2024 to strengthen the commitment and effectiveness of international technology cooperation?
We asked four experts in international technology cooperation what they hope to see happen in 2024. One word kept cropping up: miniliateralism. In a world marked by conflict, complexity and multilateral stagnation, small cooperative blocs of countries are burgeoning as models of international cooperation. Forums such as the G7, BRICS, and I2U2 offer a perceived flexibility and strategic value that is resonating with global leaders. Jose W. Fernandez, US Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, recently enthused about minilaterals as “the way of the future [...] focused, agile, and if we do them right they are going to bring results.” A growing cadre of policymakers and analysts agrees.
One policy area in which countries are turning to minilaterals is technology cooperation, where a need for momentum, peer learning and idea sharing, and robust trade arrangements is key. Against a backdrop of sclerotic multilateral technology policy development leaders are turning to small-group alliances to address the challenges of an increasingly technology-driven world. I2U2—comprising India, the UAE, Israel, and the US—and 3SI, designed to secure Baltic resilience and buffer against the twin geopolitical forces of Russian expansionism and dependency on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), are technology and infrastructure-focused by design. Technology cooperation is also a new focal point for prominent cross-thematic groupings. The G7 Leaders’ recent establishment of International Guiding Principles on Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one high-profile example. Our experts reflect on this tendency, and note other developments that they hope to see in 2024.
“The most important thing we should be considering is the careful design of new institutions to enable effective international governance of AI. It’s critical to create the space for policy makers to really understand technology, and to have informed decisions. Especially as technology becomes more complex, we must come to grips with the complexity in policy. It is not good enough to say ‘it’s too complex’ or treat it as a black box.
The resources aimed at inclusive and responsible technology need to be proportionate to its importance/risk. We need a lot more investment in building responsible systems, and in evidence to support this.
We also need more spaces for cross-sectoral, global discussions that create space for sharing across local communities, regions, countries, getting away from discussions centred on, or exclusively focused on, the Global North.”
Sara Pantuliano, PhD is CEO of ODI.
“In an age of increasing uncertainty and challenge on both economic and security fronts, minilateralism can be a powerful tool of international cooperation. Minilaterals – small, trust-based networks with a shared set of values – can act with agility and break down barriers to cooperation. Where more traditional multilateral organisations struggle with legacy relationships and hierarchies, minilaterals can overcome these by virtue of their novelty and newly constituted relationships. In 2024, I would like to see greater use of minilaterals across a number of domains: grappling with technological advancement; economic stability and trade networks; and wider security and defence concerns.”
Antonio Weiss, PhD is Affiliated Researcher, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge University and co-author of ‘Digital minilateralism: How governments cooperate on digital governance’ with Tanya Filer.
“In 2024 I hope to see:
1/ The G7 code of conduct finalising
2/ The UK AI safety summit leading to a minilateral organisation for AI safety
3/ The UN begin to establish an IPCC style body for AI (not an IAEA type body)”
Chris Meserole, PhD is Executive Director of the Frontier Model Forum and Former Director, Brookings A.I. & Emerging Tech Initiative.
“In 2024 I hope to see the growing range of technology minilaterals enter a new phase of organisational maturation. Many minilateral groups started life informally, as trust-based ‘talking shops.’ The flipside of this informality is often less developed organisational practices and structures. They may lack a secretariat or collective budget, posing challenges for decision-making, funding allocation, and institutional memory—how organisations remember what has worked or not before. The G7, a significant gathering of major industrial democracies, lacks a permanent secretariat. The organisational capacity of I2U2 is also limited in governance structure and staffing commitment. 3SI has reportedly struggled to maintain momentum between summits.
Minilaterals focused on technology trade and governance, and technology-related infrastructure already offer value to member countries and beyond, and could help support cooperation on a wide set of complex international challenges. They could help disentangle aid from terror, including by encouraging more accountable supply chains. They could serve as a lighthouse for responsible AI use that other countries might follow. Limited bureaucratisation can have advantages, depending on intended outcomes. But for minilaterals to foster effective long-term technology cooperation and help nation-states navigate an environment of rapid technological change, they must now address crucial questions and trade-offs regarding organisation, governance, accountability, and global positioning.”
Tanya Filer, PhD is CEO of StateUp.